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Environmental Health & Safety Newsletter
Spring 97
EH&S Mission Statement
The Medical College of Georgia, Environmental Health and Safety Division provides environmental safety services to staff, patients, and visitors. The three sections of EH&S - Radiation Safety, Environmental Health & Occupational Safety
(EHOS) and Biological Safety ensure full compliance with all local, state and federal laws and effectively and efficiently meet the needs of those who require our services. We will continually improve the level and quality of services provided through creativity, teamwork and innovation.
IN THIS ISSUE:
A Dartmouth College Chemistry Professor Dies of Mercury Poisoning
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
Security of Radioactive Materials
Questions & Answers: Am I really being safe with chemicals?
Building-related Problems & Indoor Environmental Quality
Responsibility for Safety in the Lab
Available Chemicals
Computer Update
Dartmouth College Chemistry Professor Dies of Mercury Poisoning
A chemistry professor died June 8 from complications associated with exposure to a few drops of dimethylmercury. While working with the synthetic compound, a small amount spilled, and was absorbed through the skin. The professor was reportedly wearing latex gloves, but did not realize the compound had permeated the gloves.
The chemistry professor had served as a faculty member at Dartmouth for 21 years, and was a professor of chemistry at the time of her death. She had also served as Dean of Graduate Studies, Associate Dean of Faculty for the Sciences, and Acting Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences. She authored more than 85 research papers, was a member of several scientific societies, an officer of the Women in Cancer Research and a past officer of the American Association for Cancer Research.
The Dartmouth professor was a research chemist with an international reputation. Her research activities involved understanding how, at elevated levels, elements known as heavy metals interfere with processes such as cell metabolism and the transfer of genetic information. At the time of the accident, the professor was using dimethylmercury to examine the effects of toxic metals on human cells.
She reportedly was exposed in August 1996. The professor reported symptoms of exposure in January 1997, went into a coma in February 1997, and died on June 8, 1997 at 48 years of age in the Dartmouth- Hitchcock Medical Center.
The chemical she was exposed to, Dimethylmercury, is highly toxic, flammable and a neurological hazard. It is toxic by inhalation, skin contact, and if swallowed. Acute exposure may cause nervous system disturbances, congenital malformation in the fetus and death if inhaled, swallowed or absorbed through the skin.
In contrast to inorganic mercury compounds, alkyl mercury compounds rapidly pass through the placenta and blood brain barrier. The peripheral and central nervous systems and the kidney are major target organs. Methylmercury poisoning symptoms result primarily from damage to the nervous system. Symptoms include loss of sensation in the hands and feet and in areas around the mouth, diminished vision resulting in tunnel vision, ataxia, dysarthria and hearing loss. Severe poisoning produces blindness, coma and death. There is a latent period of weeks to months before development of poisoning symptoms. Mercury shows a specificity to damage small nerve cells in the cerebellum and visual cortex. Methylmercury causes degeneration and necrosis of neurons in the focal areas of the cerebral cortex. Exposure controls/personal protection precautions are: the use of a fume hood, chemical resistant gloves, safety goggles, other protective clothing and avoidance of prolonged or repeated exposure. Extra precautions should be taken in the event of a spill.
Before handling any chemical, read the MSDS. All recommended precautions should be taken, and spills should be cleaned by trained individuals.
If you have any questions concerning chemicals or chemical hazards, contact EHOS at ext. 1-2663, or look for us on the MCG home page under Services. News from the INTERNET.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
This act established new provisions to regulate the transfer of hazardous biological agents and required the Department of Health and Human Services to issue rules to implement these provisions.
Commercial suppliers of select agents and government agencies, universities, research institutions, individuals and private companies that transfer or obtain these agents must register with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Select agents are those associated with serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic intervention may be available such as Brucella
abortus, Coxiella burnetti, Yellow fever viruses, and/or agents likely to cause serious or lethal human disease for which preventive or therapeutic interventions are not usually available, such as Lassa fever virus, Ebola or Marburg Viruses. Select agents also include toxins such as
Aflatoxin, tetrodotoxin, Conotoxin and Botulinum toxins.
Upon request, Biological Safety will provide a list of the select agents and other additional informative descriptions for your review. If a laboratory or researcher plans to transfer, obtain or receive any of these agents, EH&S must be notified in writing so they can be registered. Specific application forms for each class of select agents are available through Biological Safety. Registration is valid for three years.
If you currently have select agents on site, but do not plan to transfer them off or outside of the MCG campus, you do not need to register these agents.
All faculty members will receive a copy of the list of select agents.
For more information or questions concerning this act, contact Emma S. Santini, Ph.D., Biological Safety, FT-107, ext. 1-2591, or FAX 1-2447.
Security of Radioactive Materials
Written by Bill Stephany, Ph.D., Assistant Radiation Safety Officer
Background Information
MCG’s radiation safety program was audited recently by the state’s Department of Natural Resources. We were prepared for an incisive, comprehensive audit and therefore focused on “hot” issues that have attracted the attention of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The hottest of these issues is the security of radioactive material, precipitated by recent occurrences of deliberate contamination and loss of accountability of radioactive material, viz., P-32 contamination of a pregnant worker and 26 other individuals at the NIH in 1995 and a more recent, apparently deliberate, contamination of a worker’s lock and locker at a Syncor facility with Tc-99m.
Radioactive material security is not a new requirement. However, interpretation of regulations is subject to the “whims of change.” This means establishing measures, reasonable by current interpretation, to prevent the unauthorized removal of radioactive material from our work areas. In the “free” environment of the campus buildings, where almost anyone can walk through a building and even enter a laboratory, there is no simple way to achieve security. In contrast, security can be established effectively using armed guards at controlled access points, as it is at the Savannah River Site and at every nuclear power plant in the United States. Legally, the amount of radioactivity is irrelevant! A microcurie is just as regulated as a megacurie!
Security Policy Statement
Following a topical meeting attended of 16 researchers, a radioactive material security policy statement was drafted and presented to the Radiation Safety Committee for its comment. The committee members supported the policy as stated below. The policy assures compliance with minimal impact on laboratory efficiency. Indeed, it is somewhat less restrictive than the security statement in the Radiation Safety Guide inasmuch as it allows for securing radioactive material by locking storage units only.
A locked barrier shall exist at all times between radioactive material and access by unauthorized persons, unless an authorized user is present such that any unauthorized person approaching the material could be challenged by the authorized user. In the absence of an authorized user, either the laboratory shall be locked (as when an unattended experiment is in progress) or the radioactive material (excluding radioactive waste) shall be locked in a fixed storage unit.
Thus, researchers have the option of assuring their laboratories are locked when no one is present, or of storing all material in a locked storage unit. Experiments in progress would require locked laboratories unless the user is immediately present. (We are not yet addressing security over radioactive waste. Rather, we are recommending that waste be turned over for disposal if it contains any significant activity.) The new policy statement provides for the fact that not all labs can be locked.
Q: Am I Really Being Safe With Chemicals?
A: When you work with chemicals day after day, you may forget, or take for granted how dangerous some chemicals can be. Here’s a short checklist to see how safe you are.
If you feel your answers to any of these questions are not sufficient, perhaps you’re not as safe as you should be. Consult your supervisor for a lab safety plan or contact Environmental Health & Safety at ext. 1-2663. Building-related Problems & Indoor Environmental Quality Sources of hazards may be obvious in areas associated with the handling of microorganisms, biological materials, or chemicals, and in work operations involving contact with potentially infected people. However, recognizing and identifying hazards may not be as simple in other situations such as office buildings and non-industrial workplaces. Several types of indoor environmental problems can arise in a building. When assessing building-related problems, the two most prevalent terms used are “building-related illness”
(BRI) and “sick building syndrome” (SBS). BRI is a clinically diagnosed disease affecting one or more occupants that can be associated with a specific identifiable cause. Exposure can be verified by measuring the concentration level of air contaminants. SBS is a situation in which building occupants’ non-specific symptoms cannot be associated with an identifiable cause. Symptoms including headaches, eye and nose irritation, fatigue, malaise, sinus problems and breathing problems are characteristically vague, non-specific and attributable to several different sources. When assessing
SBS, determining hazards and isolating sources may be meticulous and time- consuming. Indoor air quality (IAQ) sampling is a step in investigating building-related problems and indoor environmental quality. IAQ is the quality of breathing air inside a building. Although IAQ sampling activities may appear to be a routine mechanical job, they require a detailed knowledge of the sampling equipment, their shortcomings, when and where to sample and all factors that could influence the results. Also, investigators must be aware of regulatory standards such as OSHA permissible exposure limits (PEL), ACGIH threshold limit values (TLV), time weighted averages (TWA) and NIOSH recommended exposure limits (REL), all of which may, or may not, be enacted into laws that regulate chemical substances, physical agents, and biological exposure indices. When conducting air samples for building-related problems, the volume of air sampled must enable a representative determination of the contaminant and sampling periods must be sufficient to give a direct measure of the average full shift exposure to employees. Area samples taken by setting equipment in a fixed position in the work area are useful as an index of general contamination. Personal samples assess individual exposure levels and work well with assessing specific work operations. Concentration levels are established by the sampling method and time periods chosen to average out fluctuations that commonly occur during a routine work day. Other environmental factors that must be taken into account include: ambient air temperature, humidity, seasonal changes, unusual problems from particular work operations, problems resulting from construction or renovations, poor lighting, inadequate air flow rates, ventilation problems and anything else that could affect worker comfort, but may, or may not, present a serious health risk. In conjunction with environmental factors, investigations should include non-environmental factors such as personal, occupational and psychological perceptions because they too can affect individual sensitivity to indoor environmental changes. We all depend on our sensory processes such as sight, smell, sound or touch to determine the level of safety and comfort in our work area. Odors, noise, poor lighting, temperature and humidity variations can affect our perception. However, sensory perceptions are not always reliable. Unpleasant odors do not necessarily indicate the presence of a hazard, and many substances, such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, airborne bacteria, microorganisms and fungus do not have an odor. Because we cannot directly sense many IAQ hazards, we rely on our perceptions to help us anticipate and avoid the possibility of exposure. If we believe a hazard is present, our cognitive process may generate symptoms we associate with the perceived hazard. The extended time period associated with SBS investigation, may set up a pattern of perceptions for building occupants. When this happens, cognitive processes are enhanced, and the number of non-specific complaints increase making it more difficult to isolate sources of contamination, and symptoms may persist even after all of the problems are corrected. Sensitizing is also a problem with SBS. One example of a sensitizing effect in an office building would be exposure to volatile organic compounds from new materials. Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are used in furniture finishes, carpets, paints and coatings because they evaporate very rapidly. The evaporation process is called off-gassing. When a newly renovated building is occupied before off-gassing is complete, occupants may develop a sensitivity to VOCs, not necessarily because they are over-exposed, but because they are exposed to low levels for an extended period of time. When an individual is sensitized, the introduction of VOCs from any new product in the work area, such as a new desk or carpeting, may trigger a physiological response, even though the PEL is well below regulatory or recommended levels. Identifying hazards and isolating sources is difficult when investigating SBS because symptoms reported are characteristically vague and non-specific and can be associated with other external causes. Investigating SBS complaints is a cumulative effort with all possible contributory factors considered. SBS investigations require cooperative action, coordination of services, proper documentation of all building- related activities, proper documentation of all building related complaints, objective analysis, team work and patience. All factors that could affect investigation results, including environmental and non-environmental, should be considered, and occupants should periodically be provided with a progress report. The Medical College of Georgia’s BRI and SBS investigations are coordinated by EH&S. To learn more about building-related problem, or indoor environmental quality, call EHOS at ext. 1-2663 or look for us on the MCG Home Page. Collaborative information from the EHOS staff Responsibility for Safety in the Lab Although lab safety is everyone’s responsibility, a faculty member or principal investigator who supervises a laboratory is responsible for its safe operation. These responsibilities include:
Employees must take most of the responsibility for protecting themselves from chemical hazards. But reminders from the employer can help ensure that they take that responsibility. Here are some basic chemical safety tips to pass along or post on the bulletin board:
Modified from Environmental Compliance in Georgia, Issue # 181, December and Spotlight on Safety, Sept., 1996
Watch for new and improved things on our web page. Look for us on the Medical College of Georgia Home Page under Services. The purpose of this newsletter is to inform, educate, and entertain. We hope you enjoy this edition. If there is information you would like to see in future editions, or you would like to submit questions, comments, or suggestions to the editor, fax them to 706-721-2447, or e-mail them to
Dhobbs@mail.mcg.edu. Thank you for your support.
To request chemicals listed below, or to contribute a chemical for exchange, call EH&S, at 706-721-2663, or FAX: 706-721-2447.
Acetone 3ea 500 ml
Acetone 2ea 4 lt
Acetaldehyde 500 gr
Ammonium Acetate 6ea 500 gr
Acetic Acid 1 pt
Benzimidazole 225 gr
Calcium Carbonate 450 gr
Calcium Chloride 5 lb
Congo Red 75 gr
Ethylene Glycol Monomethyl Ether 3ea 1 qt
Ethylene Glycol Monoethyl Ether 1 qt
Fumaric Acid 1 kg
Gluconic Acid Lactone, D- 475 gr
Hydrochloric Acid 500 ml
Hydrochloric Acid 2ea 2.5 lt
Hydroxylamine Hydrochloride 6ea 100 gr
Malic Acid, DL- 1000 gr
Methionine, L- 1 kg
N,N-Dimethylacetamide 500 ml
Phenol 5ea 500 ml
Phenol Ultrapure 500 ml
Potassium Oxalate 3 oz
Potassium Permanganate 453 gr
Propanol, 2- 3ea 4 lt
Propionic Acid l 1t
Putrescine 100 gr
Sodium Hydrosulfite 4ea 500 gr
Sodium Phosphate Dibasic 500 gr
Sodium Phosphate Monobasic 500 gr
Sulfuric Acid 2ea 2.5 lt
Toluidine Blue O 25 gr
Trichloroacetic Acid 2ea 500 ml
Trichloroacetic Acid 2ea 500 ml
Exchange chemicals will be delivered to your lab upon request. Chemicals for contribution will be picked up on Wednesdays during the routine chemical waste collection.
Only after the last tree has been cut down,
only after the last river has been poisoned,
only after the last fish has been caught,
only then will you find that money can not be eaten.
Cree Indian Prophecy
Director: James S. Davis, Ph.D.
Editor: Dolly E. Hobbs
Technical Editors:
Charles Lamke, M.S.: EHOS & Biosafety
William Stephany, Ph.D.: Radiation Safety